According to win probability added, the biggest single play of Game 2 of the National League Championship Series was Cody Ross‘ third solo home run of the series that came in the fifth inning off Roy Oswalt. However, in the seventh inning the Phillies put together a couple of hits that, although they did not individually have the impact that Ross’ homer did on win probability, together had more, in part thanks to the Giants’ own tactical decisions.

While Jimmy Rollins‘ 2010 regular season was marred by injury, his bases-loaded double in the seventh inning with two outs off Santiago Casilla drove in three runs, increasing the Phillies’ chances of winning the game by 9.2 percent. While the Phillies were already winning 3-1 at that point, the game was still within reach for the Giants. In the bottom of the seventh, the Phillies were ahead only 2-1, but with one out and runners on first and second, Placido Polanco hit a single that drove in the sliding Oswalt. That play itself was an 8.5 percent WPA increase for the Phillies. Together, that’s almost an 18 percent increase.

What is particularly interesting about both hits is that each was preceded by an intentional walk. With Oswalt on first and no outs, the Phillies had Shane Victorino sacrifice Oswalt over to second, which actually decreased their win probability by 1.2 percent. Giants manager Bruce Bochy decided to return Charlie Manuel’s generosity by intentionally walking Chase Utley to face Polanco, giving back that same 1.2 percent of WPA.

Viewers must have felt a sense of déjà vu just a bit later. With Polanco on second, Utley on third, and two outs, the Giants intentionally walked Jayson Werth, bringing in Casilla to pitch to Rollins, who then drove in the three final runs of the game to effectively put the game out of reach for the Giants. The irony, of course, is that of the three baserunners Rollins’ double drove in, two were deliberately put on base by the Giants. Utley and Werth are, of course, very good hitters (although it is also worth noting that they are also both good baserunners), but neither Polanco nor Rollins is a slouch. Perhaps the Giants were hoping for a double play. However, in Rollins’ case, he is actually better than average at avoiding the double play. Polanco is slightly worse than average in regard to double plays, not enough to offset the risk of having another baserunner.

Those additional baserunners weren’t the deciding runs in the game, of course. Polanco’s and (especially) Rollins’ hits probably would have driven in runners either way, as the intentional walks did not advance any runners. But giving Philadelphia free baserunners certainly didn’t help the Giants’ chances of going up two games to none in the series.

Andre Dawson’s election to the Hall of Fame this weekend is being celebrated by many different groups: fans of the dearly departed Montreal Expos who witnessed Dawson at his peak, fans of the Chicago Cubs who enjoyed his somewhat-dubious 1987 MVP performance and many others who admired Dawson as much for his character as for his baseball ability.

One group should be added to this list: analysts eager for a “baseline” Hall of Famer, a player about whom one could say, “If this guy is in, any player whose career has been as good or better should be in.”

Using Dawson as the baseline, what currently active outfielders are currently deserving of enshrinement in Cooperstown?

Dawson makes a good baseline because, while there was hardly a consensus that he should be in the Hall, few felt his election was a travesty. If you compare Dawson’s career Wins Above Replacement (WAR) with other consensus Hall of Famers, he comes off as in the same league. Rather than relying on arbitrary milestones such as numbers of hits, home runs or runs batted it, WAR measures a player’s offensive, positional and playing time contributions relative to the leagues in which the player played.

Dawson’s career WAR, according to FanGraphs, included being 246 runs above average offensively and 69 runs above average in the field. After adding in his playing time contributions and position, it all comes to 62.3 WAR.

But we don’t want “mere accumulators” getting into the Hall, we want someone with at least several years of greatness. To clarify: something like a 2.0 WAR season is league average. While Dawson had a number of average-ish seasons, he also had four or five above-average, 3.0-4.0 WAR seasons (including his 1987 MVP season), but most importantly, he had a tremendous four-year peak in Montreal from 1980 to 1983; in those four years his WAR value never dropped below 6.1. By setting out his career seasonal WAR on a line graph moving from his best to worst seasons, we can generate a “visual baseline” against which to compare others (you can view the graph in a new window here):

Some currently active outfielders with career WAR metrics around Dawson’s are Manny Ramirez (72.1 career WAR), Andruw Jones (69.0), Jim Edmonds (67.1), Vladimir Guerrero (61.5) and Bobby Abreu (60.0).

Here’s a chart comparing Ramirez and Dawson (you can view it in a new window here):

Whereas Dawson neatly balanced offense and defense, Ramirez’s reputation as a bad fielder is reflected by TotalZone and UZR’s evaluation of him at 154 runs below average. However, Ramirez has been an absolute monster with the bat, at nearly 700 runs above average. As the graph shows, while Dawson’s peak was slightly better than Ramirez’s, the bulk of Manny’s career was superior. Whatever the voters make of Manny’s personal reputation, the numbers taken by themselves (including 554 home runs and counting) peg him as a Hall of Famer.

The chart comparing Dawson and Andruw Jones can be seen here (new window):

Jones has more career WAR than Dawson, but also embodies two minefields for players facing traditional voters. First, while Jones was a very good hitter in his prime, the bulk of his value comes from his defensive exploits, which, according to TotalZone and UZR, rank him as the best defensive outfielder of all time by far.

Everyone agreed that Jones was defensively great at his peak, but will they buy into defensive metrics enough to think he was that good? Second, while Jones was an absolute monster for seven or eight seasons, his sudden collapse in 2008 highlights the “peak versus overall career” issue. Still, if Dawson is a Hall of Famer, Jones’ 11 best seasons were all more valuable than Dawson’s 11 best, and he’s one of the best defensive center fielders of all time, if not the best — should he be kept out of the Hall for not tacking on two or three more mediocre seasons at the end?

Now the chart for Dawson versus Edmonds (new window):

Jim Edmonds is currently enjoying a surprisingly successful age-40 revival with the Milwaukee Brewers. This is perhaps not completely surprising, as his best seasons according to WAR were in his 30s — unlike most players, who peak during their mid- to late-20s. Like Jones, Edmonds’ down years were not as good as Dawson’s, but his peak was slightly better and lasted longer.

Here’s the chart comparing Dawson to the currently revived Vlad (new window):

While Vlad was a decent enough fielder in his prime, most of his value comes from his bat, which seemed to make hard contact with everything inside (and outside) of the strike zone. Guerrero’s relative lack of postseason experience and gaudy counting numbers might hurt him with the voters, but his best seasons are equal to Dawson’s, and his peak lasted longer.

Here’s the chart comparing Dawson to Abreu (new window):

Bobby Abreu has spent most of his career being underrated. While he has hit 30 or more home runs only twice, he has tremendous plate discipline (.401 career OBP). Having a long career that peaked in his mid-20s perhaps also made it seem like he was constantly in decline, particularly given the way that his defense collapsed in latter years. It would be quite surprising if Abreu was voted into the Hall, yet his overall career WAR is essentially the same as Dawson’s, and his peak was just as impressive and lasted three seasons longer.

The players above are older players near the end of their careers. What about guys who are younger now and their chance of reaching this “Dawson line?”

Here’s a chart that looks at Dawson in comparison to Matt Holliday, Ryan Braun and Carl Crawford (you can view it in a new window here):

Ryan Braun is only 26, and his 2008 and 2009 seasons at the plate were better than any single offensive season of Dawson’s. Yet his best overall season (2009) barely reached 5.0 WAR — impressive, but not Hall of Fame quality. Given his dreadful chops in the outfield, he’s probably going to have to hit like Manny to reach Dawson’s overall standard. Carl Crawford (28) contributes in every phase of the game, and gets plenty of attention because of his steals. Still, Dawson has four seasons better than Crawford’s best. Matt Holliday’s 2007 season ranks with Dawson’s best, but while he has several other excellent seasons on his résumé, none of them match Dawson’s peak, and Holliday is already 30. While Braun and Crawford are younger than Holliday, it’s worth noting even from the players listed above that it is very rare for a great player to have his best seasons in his 30s (as Edmonds did).

This isn’t to say it’s unforeseeable that Crawford, Braun or Holliday might have new levels of greatness awaiting them — just that it is highly unlikely. Nor is it to deny that these are three of the best outfielders currently active in the major leagues. They have so far fallen short of what is typically necessary to reach the Hall of Fame standard set by Dawson’s “baseline” career; this should simply help us appreciate the gap between “very good” and “all-time great.”

It’s that time of year again: the time for hand-wringing about the way Major League Baseball selects its All-Star position players. Is there a way beyond all the gnashing of teeth about the alleged silliness of fan voting, stuffing the (virtual) ballot box, and so on? Maybe not. But there are more objective methods of measuring overall player value available to the public than in the past. Bloggers have come up with some ingenious suggestions for using multiple seasons or even full-blown projections to generate “true talent” All-Star teams, but let’s take a more simple approach using FanGraphs’ implementation of Wins Above Replacement to see what players have been the most valuable at each position in the league so far this season (as of June 22).

Joe Mauer is having a good season (if slightly disappointing for him) and just barely squeaks ahead of Victor Martinez. Mauer’s teammate Justin Morneau, on the other hand, is having a season even Albert Pujols would be proud of. Robinson Cano is stepping out from the shadows of more celebrated Yankees by having a dominant season at the plate and being above average in the field. Marco Scutaro is having a well-rounded season at shortstop, even if his presence is also a testimony to the relative weakness at that position in the American League this season.

This is about what we’ve come to expect from Evan Longoria, and given that he is only partially through his third season, that we have such high expectations for him says as much about him as any other superlatives. Fellow Ray Carl Crawford is having a good year even by his lofty standards, and Alex Rios, coming off a disastrous 2009, looks like one of the best outfielders in baseball. Two Rangers round out the All-WAR AL All-Stars: Josh Hamilton is the third outfielder mostly on the strength of his recent offensive outburst, and Vladimir Guerrero still has enough left in the tank to outhit the rest of the primary DHs in the AL.

There isn’t as much competition among the NL catchers, and Brian McCann is clearly the class of that group this season. Adrian Gonzalez, not surprisingly, is a major part of the Padres’ current revival. Chase Utley is having a down season relative to his usual standard, but it’s more than enough to be the best second baseman in the National League. Troy Tulowitzki is currently leading all NL shortstops but is also out for a couple of months, and Hanley Ramirez is right behind him at 2.2 WAR. Ryan Zimmerman is having another excellent year behind the veil of Strasburg mania. Marlon Byrd is playing less like the stopgap everyone thought he would and more like, well, an All-Star. Matt Holliday is the second best outfielder so far in the National League; despite not really having heated up with the bat yet, UZR is impressed with his glovework (in a small sample size).

The big surprise on the WAR leaderboards is the Giants’ Andres Torres, a capable player, but not someone one would have seen as an All-Star before this season, in which he has played well on both sides of the ball. There aren’t any “primary DHs” in the National League, of course, but Albert Pujols has been the most valuable hitter in the National League other than Gonzalez so far, and really, it would be laughable to have an All-Star Game without the best player in baseball, wouldn’t it?

The Astros are off to a rollicking 1-8 start, finally getting a win yesterday against the Cardinals after opening the season with eight consecutive losses. They aren’t losing a bunch of close ones, either. Through the first nine games, Houston has allowed 45 runs while only scoring 19. According their Pythagorean Win expectation, they have earned their 1-8 record. But are the Astros really this bad? After all, they do have former All-Stars such as Carlos Lee, Roy Oswalt and, when he returns from injury, Lance Berkman.

However, even before Berkman’s DL stint, the Astros were expected to be terrible. CHONE’s “optimistic” projection forecasted the Astros for 72 wins this season. CAIRO, another projection system, saw the Astros being even worse in 2010, at 69-93.

The Astros have been heading this direction for a while. While Wandy Rodriguez and Hunter Pence are good players in their prime seasons, and Michael Bourn is a useful piece, Berkman and Oswalt aren’t the forces they were a few years ago, and Carlos Lee’s bat is heavily offset by his poor fielding. (And right now, Lee is “hitting” .086 with zero extra-base hits, so he can’t even fall back on his bat.) Other than that core, there is altogether too much reliance on players best suited for the part-time duty (Kaz Matsui) and others who may not be suited for the major leagues (J.R. Towles). The pitching isn’t quite as disastrous, but that’s only relatively speaking — the drop-off after Oswalt and Rodriguez is sharp, and the bullpen is nothing special, despite general manager Ed Wade’s predictably silly $15-million investment in Brandon Lyon this past winter.

Despite the fact that it is only the second week of the season, it is no longer early in Houston. With a 1-8 start to the season, the Astros would have to win 59 percent of their games the rest of the way to end up with 90 wins on the season. This team simply isn’t good enough to play at that level for five and a half months. It’s too early to say that they’re definitely the worst team in baseball, but it’s not too early to write off their playoff chances.

Red Sox catcher Jason Varitek was an integral part of Boston’s championship teams of 2004 and 2007, but he’s pretty clearly in the decline phase of his career. The Red Sox are aware of this, given their trade for catcher Victor Martinez in 2009. But believe it or not, Varitek isn’t entirely useless, and this isn’t because of any “intangibles,” the “C” on his uniform, or the time he took a swing at A-Rod while keeping his catcher’s facemask on. Strictly by the numbers, Jason Varitek still has something to offer as a player.

In 2009, Varitek hit .209/.313/.390. And over the last three seasons he hit .229/.322/.390. Those are pretty dreadful lines. However, slugging catchers like Joe Mauer and Brian McCann are far from the norm. Last year, the average catcher hit .254/.321/.396. That means that Varitek’s hitting line is pretty much average for a backstop.

Wins Above Replacement (WAR) is useful for cases just like this. Since average major league players have substantial value, WAR uses a different baseline, combining offense, defense, and a positional adjustment to see how many wins over a freely available Triple-A talent (a “replacement player”) each player contributes given his playing time. Over a full season, 2 WAR is about average. According to FanGraphs, Varitek was worth 1.2 WAR in 2008 and 1.3 in 2009. What is a replacement level catcher? In similar playing time, Rays catcher Dioner Navarro was worth a -0.2 WAR in 2009. He “hit” .218/.261/.322 and ended up just barely below replacement level.

Varitek, who turned 38 years old is April, is best suited as a part-timer at this point, but he has a role to play for the Red Sox. Martinez hasn’t caught more than 100 games since 2007. It’s extremely rare for any team, even the Red Sox, to have an above-average player on the bench. And though Varitek is probably just a tick below average, that’s still very good for a back-up catcher. Boston looks to be in another tight race this season, and on the days when Martinez isn’t catching, they could do much worse than Varitek, who is still a perfectly useful big league backstop.

The Setup

It’s generally pretty easy to tell who is good at baseball. You don’t need to be a rocket scientist to realize that Joe Mauer’s .365 batting average last year was tremendous, especially for a catcher. Likewise, pretty much anyone can recognize greatness in Prince Fielder’s 46 home runs, Zack Greinke’s 2.16 ERA or Tim Lincecum’s 261 strikeouts.

However, as baseball fans, we were born with the desire to argue over whether one player is better than another, and these numbers do not lend themselves to easy comparison. Mauer doesn’t have an ERA, because he’s not a pitcher. The Giants don’t care that Lincecum failed to hit a home run last year. Even comparing offensive players to other hitters can be a problem; Fielder would be a disaster at shortstop, so stacking his numbers up against Troy Tulowitzki’s is comparing a massively large apple to oranges.

Thankfully, we now have a metric that allows for comparison among players across positions, and even between pitchers and hitters, totaling up all the things each does to help a team win, no matter what his particular skill is. Hitters, defenders, pitchers — everyone is graded on the same scale. This is why we love Wins Above Replacement.

The Proof

WAR, as it is often abbreviated, is fairly simple in theory. The idea is to take a player’s total contribution in creating runs (hitting and baserunning), as well as preventing them (pitching and defense), and then compare those totals to what a team would have expected to get if they had spent the league minimum on some randomly available Triple-A player (the so-called “replacement player”).

By measuring all contributions by the run value they create (or save), we can measure widely different things, such as strikeouts and home runs. For example, a single is worth, on average, about half a run, a stolen base is worth about 0.2 runs, and a strikeout takes away approximately 0.3 runs. So, if Derek Jeter is 2-for-4 with two singles, a stolen base and two strikeouts in a particular game, he has created approximately 0.6 runs on offense.

Because every action on the field affects run-scoring to one degree or another, we can then compare that total to other players’ performances, even if they didn’t have any singles, stolen bases or strikeouts. For example, if Mark Teixeira went 1-for-4 with a home run in that same game, he would create a very similar offensive value to Jeter’s, even though he had one fewer hit and made an extra out. His long ball was more impactful than any one thing that his speedier teammate did, and the trade-off between quantity and quality essentially cancels out.

We can apply this concept to all aspects of the game, not just offense. Each out created by a pitcher or defender also saves runs, and once we translate their numbers into a total of runs saved, we can then compare those numbers across positions. (Due to the particular challenges of quantifying a catcher’s defensive value, all catchers are assumed to be equally average behind the plate, so your favorite good defensive catcher will be underrated by WAR. This is the stat’s biggest flaw.)

Without getting into all the of the calculations — you can find a 14-part, in-depth series on how WAR is calculated in the glossary at FanGraphs if you’re curious — WAR then takes those total values of runs saved and created, adjusts for relative scarcity between different positions, and converts runs into wins over what a team would expect to lose if that player got hurt and had to be replaced by some veteran minor leaguer or journeyman bench guy.

That guy is the baseline because he represents the expected value that could be had for no real cost. For instance, a year ago, the Mariners signed Mike Sweeney to a minor league contract and gave him a part-time job as their designated hitter against left-handers. He made no real money, produced just a fraction of a Win Above Replacement, and is now looking for work again. At this point in his career, Sweeney is the epitome of a replacement-level player. He costs nothing, produces at a level good enough to hang around without being overly useful, and bounces from one club to another looking for work each year.

In reality, WAR could be named “Wins Above Mike Sweeney,” because players just like him are the baseline against which all players are compared.

The Conclusion

Bill James once said that if a metric always gives surprising results, it is probably wrong, and if it never gives surprising results, it’s useless. WAR succeeds marvelously on this account. In 2009, for example, it matches quite well with the players we would expect to have been the best (Zack Greinke, Albert Pujols, Tim Lincecum, Joe Mauer) and worst (Yuniesky Betancourt, Jose Guillen, Aubrey Huff), while surprising us enough to be useful (Ben Zobrist’s outstanding season, Jermaine Dye’s decline). Of course, given the small difference in WAR between Zobrist, Pujols and Mauer, along with the catcher-defense flaw in the stat, it is reasonable to conclude that Mauer was the most valuable every-day player.

WAR is not perfect, but it does a very good job of grading an individual player’s contribution, crediting him for what he produces on the field. Replacement level is a good baseline that accounts for how the baseball market actually works, and it enables teams and fans to better evaluate contracts and trades. It takes into account all aspects of a position player’s game rather than just his obvious strength or weakness. And finally, it is measured on the scale of wins, which every fan can understand is the whole point of playing the game in the first place.