Archive for ESPN Insider 2010

While losing 97 games last season, the Cleveland Indians were the worst team in baseball at the two facets of run prevention. No other team ranked in the bottom five of Major League Baseball in both Fielding Independent Pitching (28th of 30) and Ultimate Zone Rating (26th), signaling problems with their pitchers and fielders alike. That’s bad, but is it fixable?

A lot of last year’s pitching problems can be blamed on trial and error, as the Indians tried an AL-leading 29 different pitchers on the mound. The hurlers projected to make up this season’s rotation, led by stalwart Jake Westbrook, provide a telling comment on the organizational philosophy for better run prevention in 2010: groundballs.

An average Major League Baseball team turns a groundball into an out about 67% of the time; it’s the most pitcher-friendly ball in play. The Indians rotation, not coincidentally, is built around pitchers that throw sinkers and induce grounders. Westbrook’s return from injury paves the way for this strategy, but he’s joined in practice by Fausto Carmona, Justin Masterson and Aaron Laffey. Together, the four have a career GB/FB rate of 2.46 versus the approximate league average of 1.7.

To collect all the wormburners this staff is sure to produce, the Tribe have put together an infield of shortstops. Along with incumbent shortstop Asdrubal Cabrera, third baseman Jhonny Peralta and second baseman Luis Valbuena both have experience at that position. Like the Mariners, an organization that has built an outfield with two centerfield-caliber defenders (Ichiro Suzuki and Franklin Gutierrez), the Indians are hoping an infield featuring three players with experience at shortstop will be far more efficient at turning grounders into outs. The key to Cleveland’s success is whether these are the correct three infielders. All three ranked below average in Ultimate Zone Rating a year ago, combining to cost the Indians 15.6 runs with their glove.

However, most statheads will tell you that you need at least three years of fielding data to reach an accurate conclusion, and none of these three infielders have played more than 127 games at their current spot. Therefore, we can’t say they are below-average fielders based on UZR just yet. But if you put any faith in the fan projections featured at FanGraphs, there isn’t much reason for optimism: The trio is projected by our readers to cost the club -3.6 runs collectively. The jury’s still out on this threesome, and the groundball-inducing staff will be praying that all of them can live up to their shortstop pedigree. If not, it’s going to be another long year at Jacobs Field.

Dodger fans and fantasy owners alike had plenty of reasons for disappointment with Russell Martin’s 2009 season. The catcher saw a drop in basically every batting measure, from AVG, HRs, and RBIs to walk and home run rate. This is especially alarming for a 27-year-old hitter who is supposed to be entering his peak years. The news seemed to get worse for the club when it was revealed yesterday that Martin will miss at least four weeks with a pulled groin. But upon further review, this might be good news.

The biggest issue last year Martin was his precipitous drop in power, which can be seen through his ISO, or Isolated Power. ISO is calculated by subtracting batting average from slugging percentage, and measures raw power by looking at extra bases per at-bat. Martin’s ISO dropped from .176 to .079 over the past two years, and went from fourth best among catchers in 2007 to 2nd worst in 2009.

Martin’s ability to pull the ball with power just fell off a cliff in 2009. On balls hit to left field, Martin ran a .220 ISO or better each year prior, but last season he only managed a .119 ISO on balls hit to left. The key is a lack of home runs. He hit just four dingers to left last last year, which is seven fewer fewer than he managed in both 2007 and 2008. Adding to the issues, he hit more infield flies to the left side than ever before. With balls hit to the left side comprising over 40% of his balls in play, this was a major factor in his power loss.

There is, however, a good chance that Martin’s power sees a moderate pickup this season, as we could just be seeing some bad luck. HR/FB rates don’t tend to stabilize until after 300 balls hit into play, and Martin only hit 176 balls to left field last year. For his career, Martin has hit a homer on 6.7 percent of fly balls, but that figure was just 3.9 percent last year. That means we should expect Martin to perform closer to his career rates, although a full return to his 2007 level (9.7 percent) is very unlikely.

There has been growing speculation that Martin has been overworked behind the plate, and he led the majors with 414 starts behind the plate over the last three seasons. Some say this is the reason for his decline in production. Therefore, this groin injury could be a blessing in disguise as it should spare Martin’s knees from some unneeded wear and tear. Even before the injury, manager Joe Torre expressed a desire to limit Martin’s games played at the position. If Martin is able to come back from this injury and produce at a high level once again this year, it could be that this period away from catching was one of the reasons why.

Prince Fielder is a big dude. In fact, according to Baseball Reference.com, he is the only position player in baseball history to weigh over 250 pounds while measuring under six feet tall (he’s listed at 5-foot-11, 270). Fielder puts his size to good use, though; Over the past three seasons he has hit 130 home runs, which place him second among all major leaguers. It’s no surprise that many Milwaukee Brewers fans dread the 2011-2012 offseason, when Fielder will reach the six years of service time required to hit free agency.

Last winter, Mark Teixeira signed an eight-year, $180 million contract, and he’s not a significantly better hitter than Fielder. But, considering the risks a multi-year deal poses, teams may consider Fielder’s weight a deterrent. Only 14 position players in baseball history have weighed more than 260 pounds, and all of them have at least a few inches on Fielder. This leaves us with few players for comparison in terms of body mass.

The two best comparables on the list are Carlos Lee and Dmitri Young. Lee hasn’t faced many weight-related issues, and in fact has remained healthy for most of his career. The only significant time he missed over the past seven years was the result of a Bronson Arroyo pitch that broke his pinky finger in 2008. Young provides a more cautionary tale. Baseball America’s No. 29 overall prospect in 1997, he started his career strong, hitting 72 home runs and 157 doubles in his first five MLB seasons. He posted inconsistent numbers over the next seven seasons and was out of baseball at 34.

Two other names stand out as comparables. Mo Vaughn struggled during his first two years in the league, but broke out at age 25 and became one of the league’s premier sluggers. By age 31 his performance was in decline, and he missed all of his age-33 season to injuries, before finding himself out of the game by 35. Prince’s father, Cecil Fielder, was also out of baseball by age 35.

Prince will be 27 in the first year of his new deal. Chances are, if he continues to produce, some team will take the risk that he can buck the odds and remain a marquee attraction deep into his 30s.

When the Seattle Mariners signed Chone Figgins over the winter, it was widely assumed that he would replace the departed Adrian Beltre at third base. However, when spring training opened, the team had Figgins playing second base, while last year’s second baseman Jose Lopez had moved over to third base. This move appears to be part of a growing trend in Major League Baseball.

More and more, teams are realizing that if you can play a quality third base, you probably have the skills to transition to second, and vice versa. While the traditional view has held second base as a premium defensive position (one of four “up the middle” spots that has generally been regarded as a spot for a good glove guy), modern defensive statistics such as Ultimate Zone Rating suggest that there just isn’t much of a difference between second base and third base.

A year ago, 26 players played at least 50 innings at both second base and third base, and it wasn’t just utility infielders playing part time; Alberto Callaspo, Adam Kennedy, Martin Prado, and Ian Stewart were among the everyday players who spent a decent amount of time at both second and third. As a whole, these players were one run above average at second base per 150 games played and two runs below average at third base per 150 games played. It’s a difference so small as to not be important.

Indeed, it is becoming more and more common for teams to see these positions as interchangeable. The Twins will use second baseman Nick Punto and Brendan Harris as a third base platoon, while the Cardinals signed Felipe Lopez to play both positions for their squad. The mystique of second base as a spot for glove guys and third base as the place where power hitters go is breaking down, as teams find that if you can play one, you can play the other.

Over the last couple of days, we have talked about how a player’s skill set can affect his ability to take advantage of his home ballpark. Yesterday’s discussion on Adrian Gonzalez noted that his opposite-field power made him a candidate for teams that have inviting left field areas. And while it’s likely he’ll be playing in a new park in the near future, there’s another elite left-handed hitter who we know will playing in a new park starting next month: Joe Mauer.

With the Minnesota Twins ditching the Metrodome for Target Field, everyone’s wondering how it’s going to affect the 2009 MVP. Mauer has hit 72 home runs in six years in the big leagues, including a career-high 28 a season ago. Of those 72, a staggering 46 percent have been hit to left field, and that number jumped to 58 percent a year ago. Since most of Mauer’s power is to the opposite field, the dimensions that really matter to him in Target Field are the ones to left and left center.

According to Hit Tracker Online, each of Mauer’s 2009 shots to left field went further than 350 feet. If Mauer continues to hit opposite-field home runs at this length, he’ll rack up even more round-trippers, since the dimensions of Target Field suggest that left field may actually be more welcoming to hitters than the Metrodome. At the new park, left field measures in at 328 feet, and left-center at 371 feet; the Metrodome checked in at 343 feet to left and 385 feet to left-center.

We’ll have to wait and see how the weather factors into the hitting environment, but based on the dimensions of the park, Mauer will love his new home more than his old one. And if the reports of him signing a long-term extension are true, he should be very happy in Target Field for years to come.

With the San Diego Padres rebuilding and potentially strapped for cash, the rumor engine has been operating at full roar over the possibility of an Adrian Gonzalez trade for the past six months. The Boston Red Sox and Seattle Mariners have been most frequently linked as suitors, but given Gonzalez’s style of hitting and the respective parks those two teamsplay in, he should be rooting hard to be traded to Boston.

Gonzalez, like most batters, pulls more balls than he pushes the other way. A telling split is Gonzalez’s batted-ball-type ratios. He has a ground ball percentage of 61 percent when he pulls the ball, but when he goes the other way, it is a fly ball 64 percent of the time. Those are significant differences.

Gonzalez is a fantastic hitter to all fields, but he’s especially good when hitting to left field — he had more opposite-field home runs (21, more than anyone else in baseball) than homers to center and right field combined (19) in 2009. According to work published by Greg Rebarczyk in 2007, PETCO Park is about 4 percent harder than average to hit home runs toward left and left-center fields, but Seattle’s Safeco Field is even harder to get the ball out to that area — 10 percent tougher than average.

Given that Fenway Park is roughly neutral when it comes to home runs toward left field, Gonzalez would fare much better in Beantown, where he could use his penchant for opposite-field fly balls to rain extra-base hits off the Green Monster, and home runs over it, escaping the potential death trap of Seattle’s left-center gap. Gonzalez’s agent would do well to try and kill any chance his client ends up in the rainy Northwest.

When Seattle traded for Casey Kotchman on Jan. 7, the general reaction was a shrug of the shoulders. Of course the Mariners acquired a guy who is considered one of the best defensive first basemen in the league; Jack Zduriencik has shown almost as much affection for quality glove guys as he has for his wife and kids.

However, the M’s don’t just expect Kotchman to play a nice first base in his age-27 season. The coaching staff also believes it can tap into some of the offensive potential he showed earlier in his career, and as a left-handed hitter, they believe that the friendly right-field porch in Safeco Field should help him finally deliver on some of his potential power.

The park is much friendlier to left-handed bats than right-handed hitters, who suffer the most from its asymmetrical alignment. However, there’s one problem in hoping that Kotchman takes advantage of the proximity of the right field wall -– he prefers to pound the ball into the ground.

For his career, 52.7 percent of all of his balls in play have been hit on the ground. Last year, Kotchman hit the ball in the air at the same rate as guys like Scott Podsednik and Melky Cabrera. In fact, among first basemen with at least 400 plate appearances in 2009, Kotchman hit the fewest fly balls by far –- his 29.5 percent mark was nearly five percent behind Nick Johnson, the next runner-up.

If the Mariners are going to contend in 2010, they’re going to have to get offensive production from Kotchman, and he won’t be able to take advantage of how Safeco Field is configured by driving the ball into the ground. Hitting coach Ty Van Burkleo’s biggest job this spring may just be to convince Kotchman to get under the ball once in a while.

The Setup

On June 2 of last season, heading into the top of the ninth inning with the Toronto Blue Jays up 6-4 over the visiting Los Angeles Angels, Toronto manager Cito Gaston sent Roy Halladay back to the mound. Halladay already had thrown 116 pitches in the game.

Modern pitch-count orthodoxy would have had Halladay out of this midseason game at least 10 pitches earlier. So the question stands: Why would Gaston send him back out?

Obviously, Halladay is not some young pitcher who needs to be babied, but even so, 116 pitches is a lot. Why tempt fate with one of the game’s best pitchers and potential trade bait (with the trade deadline less than two months away) for a team that almost certainly would not be making the postseason?

In the end, Halladay closed out the game with 133 pitches, giving his team the victory. Did Gaston put Halladay’s arm at risk, or did he realize that not all pitchers are the same?

Those questions are relevant, but we’re here to demonstrate something else: Not all pitches are created equal.

The Proof

There is a growing belief that high-stress at-bats are more taxing than those in relatively low-pressure situations — and therefore that pitch counts from the two scenarios should not be treated the same. If a pitcher can breeze through easy innings in one gear and then kick it up to another gear when needed, raw pitch counts might not be the best tool to assess workload, either in an individual game or over the course of a season.

To test this theory, we need some measure of what we mean by pressure. We use a metric called Leverage Index, developed by statistician Tom Tango. Leverage Index (LI for short) quantifies the impact of every situation based on how the outcome will affect a team’s odds of winning a particular game. It is scaled so the average situation is always 1.00.

For example: An at-bat in the bottom of the ninth with two runners on and one run separating the teams will have a huge LI; the outcome of the at-bat will greatly affect the likelihood of either team winning the game. On the other hand, an at-bat in the middle of a 10-0 game with two outs and no runners on has a minuscule LI.

Let’s return to Halladay’s game against the Angels. Heading into the seventh, the Jays were up 6-0. Through those first six innings, because of the big lead and a dearth of Angels baserunners, Halladay faced just two at-bats with an LI of more than 1 and many with LIs less than 0.5. The 75 pitches Halladay threw through those six innings overwhelmingly occurred during low-leverage at-bats.

That all changed in the seventh inning, when the Angels managed four runs off him; as a result, his pitching changed drastically. He started throwing his curveball much more (19 times in 58 pitches in the seventh through ninth innings, compared to just 14 times in 75 pitches through the first six frames). It worked, as the contact rate on his pitches dropped from 72 percent to 60 percent and he struck out five batters in the final two innings, slamming the door and preserving the victory.

Those last 58 pitches likely were more taxing on Halladay than the first 75. With the game close in the late innings, Halladay shifted from pounding the zone with sinkers and cutters to get weak contact to throwing his breaking ball and trying to hit the edges of the zone to get strikeouts.

Halladay is not alone in shifting his strategy in high-leverage situations, although most pitchers respond by increasing the speed on their fastballs. In 2009, the average starter threw his fastball half a mile per hour faster in high-leverage situations. This might not seem like much — but most of these higher-leverage pitches come in late innings when most pitchers have lost a couple mph off the fastball. Somehow they are able to dial it up and get that speed back and then some. Justin Verlander threw his fastball more than 2 mph faster in high-leverage at-bats than when the game was not on the line. Ted Lilly, Aaron Harang and Pedro Martinez, among others, threw it more than a full 1 mph faster.

It makes perfect sense: When the game is not close or there are no runners on, a pitcher’s best stuff is not necessary, but when the game is close, it’s time to shift to another gear. These higher-leverage pitches almost certainly take more out of a pitcher than when he is cruising.

The Conclusion

Raw pitch counts do not account for the stress a pitcher has experienced over the course of either a game or a season. It is important to track high-leverage pitches separately since pitches in those at-bats require more effort. Here are the 2009 leaders for the number of pitches thrown in high-leverage at-bats:

These guys threw the most stressful pitches in the game in 2009.

Pitcher		Total Pitches	Total High-Stress Pitches
Justin Verlander	3,937	408
Chad Billingsley	3,203	385
Felix Hernandez		3,632	337
Ubaldo Jimenez		3,570	331
Adam Wainwright		3,614	331
Javier Vazquez		3,315	296
Carlos Zambrano		2,843	276
Jon Garland		3,255	271
Barry Zito		3,204	268
Matt Garza		3,421	261

Verlander threw more pitches in 2009 than any other pitcher — and threw the most high-stress pitches. Interestingly, he also was the pitcher with the greatest increase in fastball velocity when the game got tight, which suggests he really worked hard to get out of those situations. A bit worrisome is Chad Billingsley, who ranked only 33rd in total pitches in 2009, yet threw more high-leverage pitches than any pitcher besides Verlander. He might have very well put more strain on his arm than his raw pitch count would suggest.

On the other end of the spectrum are workhorses Cliff Lee and Zack Greinke, ranked sixth and seventh in pitches thrown, respectively, but just 42nd and 35th on the high-stress leaderboard. They likely put less strain on their arms than you might conclude by just looking at their total pitch counts.

The Setup

There are a lot of things to like about Los Angeles Dodgers starting pitcher Clayton Kershaw. His fastball averages 94 miles per hour, yet he also can make hitters look foolish with a knockout breaking ball. He struck out 185 batters in just 171 innings a year ago, posting a K/9 that was the seventh-highest of any starter in baseball. He’s left-handed in a sport that covets southpaws. Oh, and he doesn’t turn 22 years old until halfway through spring training.

Even though Kershaw still struggles with his command and lacks experience, his ERA last season was even with Roy Halladay’s, and better than Johan Santana’s and Cliff Lee’s. When a pitcher is this good and this young, it is easy to dream about what the future may hold. If he’s already one of the best pitchers in the game (in this case, he is), what will happen when you give him some time to mature, learn how to pound the strike zone, mix his pitches and study hitters’ tendencies?

Unfortunately for Kershaw and Dodgers fans, history suggests that this may be as good as it will ever get for the young lefty. In fact, given the success he has had in the majors at such a young age, he may have already peaked.

The Proof

Hitters are fairly predictable, as a group. They will show flashes of potential in their early 20s, add strength and hit a physical prime in their late 20s, and then decline in their 30s. The peak age of a position player has been shown to be around 27, with most offensive players following in this same general pattern. When you find a 21-year-old who is already a good hitter, there is a good chance greatness is in store when he gets older.

The same is not true of hurlers. They do not follow an arc-shaped career path; instead, the normal career trajectory for a starting pitcher heads downward.

There are various reasons for this observed phenomenon, the most obvious one being injury. It doesn’t take a baseball historian to rattle off the names: Mark Prior, Kerry Wood and Rich Harden are just this decade’s reminders of greatness at a young age cut short by surgery. Every pitcher, no matter how talented, is just one pitch away from the office of Dr. James Andrews on any given day.

Even putting aside the possibility of attrition, pitchers still defy conventional growth curves. While improvements are made in throwing strikes and pitching more intelligently, these marginal gains are more than offset by a bigger problem — a loss of velocity.

Scott Kazmir was the last version of Kershaw when he made his debut in the majors in 2004, throwing 94 mph at the age of 20 and racking up the strikeouts. He would develop into one of the better pitchers in the American League by age 22, but his fastball and slider began to slow down. Last year, his fastball averaged just 91.1 mph, and the Tampa Bay Rays dumped their once untouchable ace on the Los Angeles Angels in order to escape his long-term contract.

Before Kazmir, there was Oliver Perez in 2004, who broke through as a 22-year-old for the Pittsburgh Pirates. His 93-mph fastball allowed him to pile up the K’s and give Pittsburgh hope that it had an ace in the making. Two years later, with his fastball down to 91, the Pirates admitted that he wasn’t fixable and shipped him to the New York Mets.

Even the best young pitchers in the game, Felix Hernandez and Tim Lincecum, have lost 2 mph off their fastballs since arriving in the big leagues. Throwing hard is a young man’s game, and one that is very hard to sustain as the workload piles up. As young pitchers learn that they have to pace themselves to get through a six-month season, they find their radar readings less impressive than they used to be.

Unlike hitters, who tend to gain power as they age, pitchers lose it. In the past 30 years, 11 pitchers have rang up at least 180 strikeouts in a single season when they were 22 or younger. The list is not full of guys on their way to Cooperstown. Instead, it stands as a sobering reminder of just how great starts to a career can go very, very wrong. Other than Fernando Valenzuela, whose age has been the subject of much speculation, the most successful pitchers of the group: Sid Fernandez, who only three times managed to throw 200 innings in a season, and Dwight Gooden, who should have been so much more than he turned out to be. Beyond those guys, there are names such as Edwin Correa and Floyd Youmans, who were out of baseball before they could even rent a car.

The Conclusion

Some pitchers can make the necessary adjustments and have long, great careers — but most don’t. More often, the next big thing on the mound becomes a sad story of what could have been. For every Lincecum or Hernandez, there’s a Rick Ankiel, a Dontrelle Willis, a Prior or a Kazmir. Whether it’s injury, pressure, or more often a fastball that decides not to show up to spring training one year, young pitchers are often the biggest disappointments.

Kershaw is a remarkably talented pitcher, having already accomplished quite a bit in his first two years in the major leagues. His arm is golden, his upside seemingly unlimited. But the reality of history shows that he’s more likely to get worse than to get better, and fans counting on Kershaw to win a Cy Young or two are likely to be disappointed.

Put your faith in young hitters like Justin Upton or Matt Wieters, who are on a career path that should lead them to better things in the future. Pitchers like Kershaw will break your heart.

The Setup

It took Nyjer Morgan just three games with the Washington Nationals to confirm to his new fans that the organization had made the right move in acquiring him. Although he recorded his first three hits as a National that day, the real attention would be paid toward his defensive efforts against the Braves.

It was July 5, to be exact, and young Washington starter Scott Olsen was struggling with his command. Nerves were high as Chipper Jones strode to the plate, following a lead-off walk to Martin Prado. Olsen made his first pitch to Jones and watched in horror as it caught far too much of the plate. Jones reacted swiftly and, just like that, a bullet was heading deep into straightaway center field.

On an ordinary day, Jones reaches second base easily, Prado scores, and the Braves have the tying run in scoring position with nobody out. However, this was no ordinary day, and Morgan is no ordinary centerfielder. Upon launch, a blaze of red set into motion, stampeding towards the wall and then suddenly extending a lone arm. The ball tucked firmly into his glove, Morgan twirled and fired it back into the infield.

Two groundouts later, the threat was over. Prado was stranded on the bases, the Nationals’ lead was secure, and Washington would hold on for a 5-3 win. It was then that fans in the nation’s capital realized that their new centerfielder might just be the best defensive player in the game.

The Proof

It isn’t just Nationals fans who think highly of his abilities. Ultimate Zone Rating, one of the most accessible advanced defensive metrics that baseball has today, is in love with the man who calls himself “Tony Plush”. Developed by Mitchel Lichtman, a statistical analyst who once served as a consultant for the Cardinals, UZR produces an above- or below-average rating, measured in runs saved, for each player drawn from multiple defensive aspects — including range, throwing arm, and errors. By this metric, the 29-year-old Morgan is off the charts.

Morgan started last season with Pittsburgh (where he played left field), but was traded to Washington (where he played center) on July 1. Over the course of the season, his total UZR was an absurd +27.8 runs above average. Many analysts agree that Franklin Gutierrez was the best full-time defensive centerfielder in baseball last season, with good reason: his centerfield UZR was +29.1, but in nearly 400 more innings than Morgan played in center. For cases like these, we can use UZR/150, a playing time-adjusted figure which calculates the player’s defensive contributions pro-rated to 150 games, and therefore gives a fairer outlook to players with disparities. Gutierrez’s UZR/150 of +27.1 is just fantastic, but doesn’t look quite as impressive when compared to Morgan’s absurd +40.5 UZR/150 in his half-season in center. A half-season’s worth of data is not enough to definitively judge a player, but Morgan’s career numbers tell a similar story. For his career, Morgan’s UZR/150 in center is 39 runs better than average.

Don’t trust UZR? No problem. Baseball analyst Tom Tango organizes the Fans Scouting Report on a yearly basis, getting input from those who watch the players on a daily basis. In 2009, fans voted Morgan as the best defensive left fielder in the game by a fair margin, and he earned an even higher rating than Gutierrez did in center. And in case you think that this was the result of playing for teams with rabid fan bases, remember that Morgan suited up for the Nats and Bucs.

Need more proof? Morgan made a substantial impact on both his current and former teams. Through the time he was traded, the Pirates had allowed 16 unearned runs and had a 4.24 ERA against. In the 82 games thereafter, they allowed 29 unearned runs scored and the team ERA bloated to 4.92. Conversely, Washington allowed 43 unearned runs and held a 5.21 ERA through its first 77 games. Those numbers shifted to 40 unearned runs and a 4.80 ERA after Morgan’s arrival.

If his UZR is to be believed, and Morgan is the best defensive player in the game, then he should be expected to take between 15 and 25 runs off the scoreboard per season compared to an average centerfielder. On the high end, that would be the pitching equivalent of going from Braden Looper’s 5.22 ERA down to Chad Billingsley’s 4.03 ERA.

The Conclusion

Whether you’re a fan of numbers, a casual observer or both, there’s no doubt Morgan is magnificent with the leather. After some brutally tough seasons, Nationals fans have found hope in phenom pitching prospect Stephen Strasburg, but they should not overlook another terrific player who has arrived in their town.

Nyjer Morgan, Tony Plush, no matter what you call him, he’s a defensive wizard beyond compare.