Misused Relievers of 2012

While setting a line-up card and deciding who plays and who sits might be the most important decision a manager makes each day, how he deploys his bullpen is almost certainly a close second. Among in game decisions, proper bullpen usage has a larger effect on the outcome than pretty much anything else, and wise use of the assets that are available can have a significant impact in deciding close games. With a continuing move towards larger bullpens and more emphasis on match-ups, reliever usage is now a critical part of a manager’s job, but not every team is getting it right this year. Here are a few examples of some teams who could benefit from changing up the way they’re deploying their bullpens.

Philadelphia Phillies, Closer

Over the winter, the Phillies gave Jonathan Papelbon $52 million to take over their closer role and solidify their bullpen, and so far, he’s lived up to expectations: 17 for 17 in save opportunities, 2.10 ERA, and a fantastic 29/4 strikeout-to-walk ratio. However, the Phillies are 6-11 in one run games, the worst mark of any team in the National League, which is one of the main reasons they find themselves in last place in the National League East. With an elite closer, the team should be better at winning close games, but the problem is that manager Charlie Manuel is just not willing to use him in any situation except where there’s a save opportunity.

This issue has been most obvious whenever the Phillies have entered the late innings in a tie score on the road. Because Manuel is holding Papelbon for a save situation should the team later take the lead, he will essentially empty his bullpen in an effort to preserve Papeblon’s ability to hold down a lead at a later point should the Phillies ever score. Bill Baer at Crashburn Alley chronicled the seven instances where this has occurred and the Phillies have gone on to lose without Papelbon ever taking the mound. In those seven situations, the game has been lost by the following pitchers: Joe Blanton, David Herndon, Antonio Bastardo, Brian Sanches, Michael Schwimer, B.J. Rosenberg (making his MLB debut, no less), and Joe Savery.

Papelbon has routinely sat in the bullpen and watched his teammates blow leads, hoping to get a chance to protect a save opportunity that never materialized. Even when he has been called upon, he’s been placed in situations that are simply less important than other closers. Here is the list of the average leverage index when a pitcher enters the game for each closer with at least 15 saves this season:

Joel Hanrahan – 1.92
Jim Johnson – 1.85
Jonathan Broxton – 1.83
Brett Myers – 1.83
Alfredo Aceves – 1.74
Craig Kimbrel – 1.73
Santiago Casilla – 1.64
Chris Perez – 1.63
Frank Francisco – 1.61
Fernando Rodney – 1.52
Jonathan Papelbon – 1.45

Papelbon ranks dead last among this group, and on average, you’d expect a premium closer to have a mark between 1.70 and 2.00. Papelbon is well below that threshold, not for lack of opportunities, but because his usage has been dictated entirely by whether or not he can accumulate a save when he’s brought into the game. Giving a pitcher the security of knowing that he’s the ninth inning guy is one thing, but then not allowing him to preserve tie games in the ninth inning or in extra innings simply because it’s not technically considered a save is just a waste of an asset. The Phillies have one really great reliever, and if they’d use him more often, they’d have more wins than they do now.

Houston Astros, Setup Man

The Astros have primarily leaned on two pitchers to protect eighth inning leads – Wilton Lopez and Fernando Rodriguez. Lopez is probably the team’s best reliever, so he’s a natural fit for the role, but the decision to utilize Rodriguez as a high leverage setup man is a bit bizarre to say the least.

Rodriguez gets a decent amount of strikeouts, which is good for getting out of jams, but that’s about the only thing he does well. He’s an extreme fly ball pitcher (50% FB%) who also struggles with his command (11.9% BB%), which is a poor combination for trying to protect narrow leads. Rodriguez’s willingness to pitch up in the zone but inability to hit his spots makes him extremely prone to allowing home runs, as he’s allowed one for every 31 batters he’s faced in his career. Because he also issues a lot of walks, six of those home runs have come with men on base. Even if you hand him a lead of two or more runs, he’s capable of giving that up in a hurry.

Meanwhile, the Astros have a Brandon Lyon – a much better pitcher with a track record of success – throwing what amounts to mop-up innings in games that have already been decided. Of the 102 batters he’s faced this year, only 13 of them have hit in high leverage situations (defined as a plate appearance with a leverage index of 1.5 or higher, meaning that the PA is at least 50% more likely to effect the outcome of the game than average), while 71 of his batters faced have come in low leverage (0.5 or lower) situations, meaning that the game is essentially over at that point.

Among Astros relievers, Rodriguez has the second highest average leverage index on the staff (1.51), while Lyon has the second lowest LI (0.80). Lyon is clearly the superior pitcher, and the Astros would win more games if they simply switched the roles these two are pitching in.

Oakland Athletics, Left-Handed Specialist

The A’s are known for being on the cutting edge of using data to make decisions, but one has to wonder how you’d fit Brian Fuentes’ usage into Moneyball. For his career, Fuentes has been one of the best left-on-left relief pitchers in baseball, using his sidearm delivery to dominate quality LHBs while just trying to survive against right-handers. Here are his career platoon splits:

Vs Left: 7.2% BB%, 28.3% K%, 0.64 HR/9
Vs Right: 10.% BB%, 22.9% K%, 1.01 HR/9

He’s not a disaster against right-handers, but he’s at his best when he’s facing mostly left-handed hitters. However, 60 of the 96 batters Fuentes has pitched to this year have been right-handed, and not surprisingly, he struggled when he was asked to pitch in the closer role. Fuentes’ skillset is perfect for seventh or eighth inning match-up work, but as the closer, he simply had to face whatever batters were coming up to bat in the ninth, regardless of what side of the plate they pitched from. There’s a reason you don’t see many sidearming closers – it’s not a very good use of their abilities.