The odds of Josh Hamilton beating Andy Pettitte on Monday night seemed minute. A good left-handed pitcher, Pettitte had to know that allowing a run or two early could be enough for Cliff Lee to secure a 2-1 lead in the series for the Texas Rangers.

There was no way Pettitte could afford to give Hamilton, Texas’ best hitter, a pitch he could drive with a runner on first base. Not in the first inning and not with Lee looming. Sure enough, he held true, but only until the fourth pitch of the at-bat. It was then that Pettitte threw Hamilton a cutter that caught far too much of the plate. Hamilton connected with an upper-body heavy swing and watched as the ball snuck over the right-field wall. Just like that, the Rangers led 2-0 only three batters into the game.

According to win probability added (WPA), Hamilton’s home run increased the Rangers’ chances of victory by 15.7 percent — pushing them near 65 percent. It is important to note that win expectancy does not measure the likelihood of the team winning by that margin or score, but rather the odds of the team winning after leading at that point in the game. That percentage also does not account for the quality of opponent or the pitching matchup. Hamilton’s home run likely would be worth more if Lee’s presence on the mound for Texas had been accounted for in the formula.

The entire sequence is a series of questionable decisions by Pettitte. Hamilton’s previous playoff opponent, the Tampa Bay Rays, held him without an extra-base hit in 20 plate appearances by tempering the amount of fastballs he saw and choosing to instead pound him with off-speed and breaking pitches. The strategy proved successful and sparked speculation that Hamilton’s rib injury, which caused him to miss four weeks late in the season, affected his ability to hit those pitches.

Admittedly, questioning the pitch selection is basing the analysis on results. Most pitch-by-pitch analysis is, much like a curveball over the middle for strike three is a successful pitch only if the batter fails to shoot the ball into orbit and a slider below the zone that Vladimir Guerrero cranks for a double is a bad pitch regardless of intent or probable outcome. Such is the life for pitchers, and such is the second-guessing that will follow Pettitte for relying on his fastball against Hamilton, likely rendering the effectiveness of the strategy in Hamilton’s subsequent at-bats irrelevant.

Sure enough, Lee shut down the mighty Yankees lineup and proved that two runs were more than enough. Hamilton helped cement the lead in the ninth with a leadoff double to catapult the Rangers into the catbird seat in the American League Championship Series.

According to win probability added, the biggest single play of Game 2 of the National League Championship Series was Cody Ross‘ third solo home run of the series that came in the fifth inning off Roy Oswalt. However, in the seventh inning the Phillies put together a couple of hits that, although they did not individually have the impact that Ross’ homer did on win probability, together had more, in part thanks to the Giants’ own tactical decisions.

While Jimmy Rollins‘ 2010 regular season was marred by injury, his bases-loaded double in the seventh inning with two outs off Santiago Casilla drove in three runs, increasing the Phillies’ chances of winning the game by 9.2 percent. While the Phillies were already winning 3-1 at that point, the game was still within reach for the Giants. In the bottom of the seventh, the Phillies were ahead only 2-1, but with one out and runners on first and second, Placido Polanco hit a single that drove in the sliding Oswalt. That play itself was an 8.5 percent WPA increase for the Phillies. Together, that’s almost an 18 percent increase.

What is particularly interesting about both hits is that each was preceded by an intentional walk. With Oswalt on first and no outs, the Phillies had Shane Victorino sacrifice Oswalt over to second, which actually decreased their win probability by 1.2 percent. Giants manager Bruce Bochy decided to return Charlie Manuel’s generosity by intentionally walking Chase Utley to face Polanco, giving back that same 1.2 percent of WPA.

Viewers must have felt a sense of déjà vu just a bit later. With Polanco on second, Utley on third, and two outs, the Giants intentionally walked Jayson Werth, bringing in Casilla to pitch to Rollins, who then drove in the three final runs of the game to effectively put the game out of reach for the Giants. The irony, of course, is that of the three baserunners Rollins’ double drove in, two were deliberately put on base by the Giants. Utley and Werth are, of course, very good hitters (although it is also worth noting that they are also both good baserunners), but neither Polanco nor Rollins is a slouch. Perhaps the Giants were hoping for a double play. However, in Rollins’ case, he is actually better than average at avoiding the double play. Polanco is slightly worse than average in regard to double plays, not enough to offset the risk of having another baserunner.

Those additional baserunners weren’t the deciding runs in the game, of course. Polanco’s and (especially) Rollins’ hits probably would have driven in runners either way, as the intentional walks did not advance any runners. But giving Philadelphia free baserunners certainly didn’t help the Giants’ chances of going up two games to none in the series.

While Cody Ross‘ two solo home runs will get the attention, it was a ball that stayed in the park that cost the Phillies their chance to win the first game of the NLCS. With two outs and a runner on first base in the sixth inning, Pat Burrell drove a ball to deep left field, and while Raul Ibanez had enough time to get under it, he couldn’t figure out how to make it land in his glove.

An awkward and unnecessary jump right before crashing into the wall helped the ball bounce off his arm, and by the time he recovered, a run was in and Burrell was on second base. Instead of the inning ending with the Phillies trailing by a run, Roy Halladay was forced to face another hitter with a runner in scoring position, and a single to center made the score 4-1.

Had Ibanez made the not-routine-but-not-that-hard catch, the Phillies’ chances of winning would have stood at 40.2 percent, and Jayson Werth’s two-run homer in the bottom of the sixth would have given them a one-run lead with their ace on the mound. Instead, they ended the top of the sixth with just a 17 percent chance of winning, and Werth’s home run proved to be a nonfactor in the result.

Halladay has had better performances, but Game 1 of the NLCS was decided by the defense of Ibanez. Ibanez’s inability to field his position was one of the main reasons the deal was roundly criticized when Philadelphia gave him a three-year, $30 million contract after the 2008 season. Ultimate Zone Rating estimated that he was 6.9 runs below average for a left fielder this year, among the worst defenders in the league at the position.

Ironically, he was brought in to replace Burrell, whose lead glove antics in left field led the Phillies to go in another direction. Two years later, Burrell got his revenge, driving a ball that his replacement couldn’t catch, and the play directly led to the Giants taking the lead in the fight for a World Series berth. While Ibanez is a decent hitter, his problems in the outfield offset a good chunk of his value, and Charlie Manuel should be more willing to remove him for defensive purposes once his team takes a lead.

The Phillies’ decision to go with offense over defense cost them in the sixth inning and hung Halladay with a loss he didn’t deserve.

The Yankees entered the eighth inning Friday night with only a 4.1 percent chance of winning.

The Rangers decided to allow C.J. Wilson to continue pitching in the eighth. The inning started off with a Brett Gardner infield single, and then Derek Jeter doubled, scoring Gardner. Wilson was pulled for Darren Oliver, who walked both Nick Swisher and Mark Teixeira to load the bases.

The Rangers then brought in Darren O’Day to face Alex Rodriguez. O’Day threw one pitch, which Rodriguez hit past third baseman Michael Young into left field. Both Jeter and Swisher scored on the play. Next, Clay Rapada was brought in to face Robinson Cano. On Rapada’s first and only pitch, Cano hit a single to center field, allowing Teixeira to tie the game.

The Rangers went to the ‘pen again for Derek Holland, who allowed Marcus Thames to single, scoring Rodriguez. The Yankees finally took the lead for the first time in the game, 6-5. All of the five runs scored in the eighth were with no outs. Holland finally was able to get three outs before any more damage was done. The chances of the Yankees winning the game soared from 4.1 percent to 67.5 percent by the end of the inning.

The Rangers went through four relievers in the eighth, and they opted to leave Neftali Feliz, their best reliever, sitting in the bullpen. The decision to not use Feliz at any time during the eighth inning will come back to haunt the Rangers. Once it was decided that Wilson could not go any farther, the Rangers should have brought in Feliz, for a couple of reasons.

First, the heart of the Yankees’ lineup — Swisher, Teixeira and Rodriguez — was due up. The Rangers should have looked at using their strongest pitcher against the Yankees’ strongest hitters. Also, the situation could not have been any more important: a runner on second, no outs. Instead, Feliz was being saved for the ninth inning to save the game. That save would never come, and four other relievers were brought in who didn’t record a single out until a 5-1 lead turned into a 6-5 deficit.

The Rangers entered the eighth inning with a great chance of winning, but everything fell apart. This a perfect example of why managers should sometimes think outside the box and use their closers when the game is on the line.

When Joe Girardi announced his rotation for the ALCS, Andy Pettitte and Phil Hughes had been flip-flopped, with Hughes now taking the ball in Game 2 and Pettitte going in Game 3. Girardi cited a variety of factors, but no doubt one of the numbers he consulted was Hughes’ home/road splits. Over his career, and continuing this year, Hughes has performed significantly better on the road than he has in New York, especially in terms of home run prevention.

This shouldn’t be all that surprising, given that Hughes is an extreme fly-ball pitcher and New Yankee Stadium is home run-friendly, especially for left-handed hitters. He’s the kind of pitcher who will be hurt most by how the park plays, and that shows up in the results. Getting him a start on the road in Game 2 seems like a good idea. But a closer look at the data suggests that this is a meaningless move.

The Ballpark in Arlington is actually a very similar offensive environment to New Yankee Stadium. Both parks are left-handed-power-friendly, increasing home runs by 24 percent (New York) and 18 percent (Texas). They’re not as nice to right-handed power hitters, though both are still above average in terms of inflating home run totals, with right-handed bats getting a 10 percent boost in New Yankee Stadium versus the five percent boost they get in Texas.

Phil Hughes home/road splits

Park  BB/9	K/9	HR/9	FIP
Home	3.28	7.72	1.43	4.58
Road	3.05	8.05	0.67	3.44

A park doesn’t just influence home runs, however, and this is where the benefit to starting Hughes in Texas begins to break down. New Yankee Stadium promotes home runs at the expense of doubles and triples, both of which occur at a lower-than-average rate in that park. In Texas, home runs are inflated, but so are doubles and triples, so offensive levels overall are higher.

By attempting to take advantage of Hughes’ road numbers, the Yankees are actually asking him to pitch in an even tougher environment than the one he faces in New York. Someone has to pitch the games in Texas, but they didn’t make Hughes’ job any easier, and they shouldn’t expect him to match his career road numbers just because he gets a start outside of the Bronx.

Over in the National League, the San Francisco Giants did the same switcheroo, swapping Game 2 and Game 3 starters from the NLDS so Jonathan Sanchez would start in Philadelphia and Matt Cain would start in San Francisco. This time, the numbers suggest it could make a pretty significant difference, as it would be hard to find two less similar parks than Citizens Bank Park in Philadelphia and AT&T Park in San Francisco.

Sanchez will now take the hill in a park that is very home run-friendly, creating 16 percent more home runs for left-handed batters and 20 percent more for right-handed hitters. However, Sanchez is the type of pitcher that is least affected by the environment in which he’s pitching, because a large percentage of his at-bats end with a walk or a strikeout. This year, 38 percent of the batters who stepped in against Sanchez failed to put the ball in play. Only 27 percent of the batters that faced Matt Cain did the same.

Sanchez’s high-walk, high-strikeout approach makes him a more suitable choice for parks that inflate run scoring, as Citizens Bank Park does. Meanwhile, AT&T Park works perfectly with Matt Cain’s skill set.

Cain, like Hughes, is an extreme fly-ball pitcher. San Francisco is one of the hardest places to hit a home run, and is most challenging for left-handed batters. The ballpark depresses home runs by lefties by 18 percent, making it the perfect place for a fly-balling right-hander like Cain to go up against Chase Utley, Ryan Howard and Raul Ibanez. The big alleys do increase doubles and triples, so it plays as a mostly fair offensive environment overall, but it’s certainly a better place to ask Cain to challenge the big left-handed bats in Philadelphia’s lineup.

Both Joe Girardi and Bruce Bochy have changed up their rotations to try to optimize their outcomes in their respective league championship series. The Giants’ switch could pay real dividends, as they are able to take advantage of the unique way each park plays. But the Yankees are just going to have to pitch well, because the two parks the ALCS will happen in are too similar to really exploit any matchup differences.

Even though managers and color commentators alike expend considerable effort in singing the praises of baserunning, research shows us that, generally speaking, runs (and, thus, wins) gained from effective baserunning pale in comparison to the contributions, respectively, of batting, pitching and fielding.

Or, rather, that’s usually the case.

Were it not for their attentive (and sometimes merely lucky) baserunning Tuesday night, it’s unlikely the Texas Rangers would find themselves en route to the American League Championship Series for the first time in the history of the organization.

Yes, the Rangers beat the Rays 5-1 in Game 5 of their ALDS largely on the strength of their legs. How much did they produce on the basepaths? Well, with the help of win probability added (WPA), we can get a sense of that very thing.

Let’s look at the first three runs — all a product of taking an extra base of some kind. In each instance, we look not only at the WPA of the play itself, but also what the play’s WPA would have been had the baserunner in question not taken the extra base. This way we’re also able to find, thirdly, the contribution of the baserunning in terms of WPA.

Note that each of the following three plays either occurred with two outs or involved the making of the second out. Furthermore, each was directly followed by a third out, meaning each play’s relative importance is, in fact, magnified.

Play No. 1

Inning: First
Situation: Josh Hamilton batting, Elvis Andrus on second base, one out, 0-0 tie
Play: On a 3-2 count, Hamilton hits a ground ball to Carlos Pena, and Andrus is off to third base on contact. David Price runs to cover first, where he takes the flip from Pena, and turns around to find that Andrus is on his way home. Price’s throw home is too late to catch Andrus.
WPA: +4.1 percent
WPA with Andrus stopping at third base: -3.5 percent
Baserunning adds: +7.6 percent

Play No. 2

Inning: Fourth
Situation: Ian Kinsler batting, Nelson Cruz on second base, two out, 1-1 tie
Play: With Kinsler batting — and moments after hitting a double when he very well could have made it to third base — Cruz attempts a steal of third. Tampa catcher Kelly Shoppach misses third baseman Evan Longoria badly on the second-base side of the bag, and the ball goes into left field. Cruz runs home to put Texas up 2-1.
WPA: +9.9 percent
WPA with Cruz safe at third: +0.5 percent
WPA with Cruz thrown out: -4.1 percent
Baserunning adds: +9.9 percent (compared with Cruz on second base), +9.4 percent (compared with Cruz on third base), +14.0 percent (compared with Cruz getting thrown out at third base)

Play No. 3

Inning: Sixth
Situation: Ian Kinsler batting, Nelson Cruz on first base, Vladimir Guerrero on second, one out, 2-1 Texas
Play: Kinsler hits a grounder to Carlos Pena. Pena throws to shortstop Jason Bartlett, thus forcing Cruz. Bartlett attempts, but is unable, to complete the double play. Guerrero, meanwhile, has progressed around third base and is headed home. Pena throws to catcher Kelly Shoppach, but Guerrero slides in safely, putting the Rangers up 3-1, and putting their overall win expectancy at about 75 percent.
WPA: +5.7 percent
WPA with Guerrero stopping at third base: -4.3 percent
Baserunning adds: +10.0 percent
All in all, what we find here is that the Rangers gained approximately +27.5 percent from just these three plays. Because a team starts — generically, at least — with about a 50 percent chance of winning, we can say that their baserunning helped them get halfway to their victory.

Of course, none of this is to ignore the dominance of Cliff Lee. With his nine-inning, 11-strikeout performance, Lee was worth +47.7 percent all by himself. However, Lee’s excellence is almost old news by now. Teams winning games so decidedly with their baserunning — that’s a story.

Cody Ross had a bit of a down year offensively, hitting .276 AVG/.333 OBP/.503 SLG between 2007 and 2009 with the Marlins while hitting .269/.322/.413 this season. His drop in power from 24 home runs in 2009 to 14 in 2010 is notable, leading to a career low in slugging percentage.

Yet it was the power and timely hitting of Ross, the eighth hitter in the lineup, which put the San Francisco Giants on the scoreboard en route to a 3-2 win over the Atlanta Braves to advance to the NLCS. Derek Lowe, a pitcher who has always been known to induce easy ground-ball outs with his sinker, had thrown five no-hit innings up to that point. Lowe unleashed a weapon that has mostly been his secondary pitch: the slider.

In his first at-bat against Lowe in the top of the third, Ross sat and waited for a pitch to hit. But after two called strikes, Lowe quickly struck him out swinging on the third, a breaking slider low and way out of the zone. To capture how deceptive Lowe’s slider was Monday night, Lowe had seven strikeouts and 14 swinging strikes, 10 of them on sliders before Ross’ next at-bat.

But in his second at-bat, Ross adjusted and came out swinging on the first pitch. His aggressive approach on his second chance against Lowe proved successful. He was able to capitalize on the only hanging slider that Lowe threw all day, hitting a first-pitch solo home run in the sixth inning. That was Lowe’s only mistake all night up to that point, and without run support from the Braves’ offense, Lowe could not afford such a mistake.

Taking a look at the game-changing plays of the day, Ross drove in the game-tying run in the sixth and what turned out to be the game-winning run in the seventh, an RBI single that came off an outside 96 mph sinker from Jonny Venters. Ross was able to get just enough wood on it to put it through the shortstop hole, driving in Buster Posey.

His ability to put pop on Lowe’s hanging slider gave the Giants a plus-18.2 percent increase in win probability added, while his single off the left-handed Venters gave them a plus-12.6 percent added chance of advancing to the NLCS. Ross led all players in the game, contributing a total of nearly plus-29 percent WPA to the Giants’ win.

Ross may have lost some power this season compared with last, but he apparently learned to hit sliders. According to FanGraphs’ pitch type values, Ross was below average against the slider every year until this season, when he was above average at hitting the slider in terms of runs.

Monday’s game showed just how tough baseball is: You can dominate for several innings just as Lowe did, but sometimes it’s the bottom of the lineup that gets to you. Ross did just that in Game 4, thrusting the Giants into the NLCS against the Phillies.

In what some have termed the Year of the Pitcher, this postseason has provided some singularly impressive pitching performances to continue the trend. Add Jonathan Sanchez to the list after his 7 1/3-inning, 2-hit, 11-strikeout Sunday afternoon that put his Giants in line to win the game and go up 2-1 in their NL Division Series with the Braves.

By keeping baserunners off the basepaths and pitching late into the game, Sanchez was the driving force behind the Giants’ win. He added 46.6 percent to his team’s win probability, and since 50 percent is the maximum, the statistic tells the story as well as any other. He got the Giants almost all the way there on his left arm alone.

Sanchez joined Game 1 starter Tim Lincecum as the only Giants in postseason history to strike out double-figure batters. Sanchez was, as usual, effectively wild (105 pitches, 69 strikes), but his bread and butter was the offspeed stuff away. The lefty got eight swinging strikes on 40 offspeed pitches, good for a 20 percent whiff percentage that blew his 4.69 percent on fastballs out of the water.

Traditionally, this is the case — offspeed stuff garners more whiffs across baseball — but Sanchez used the weapon almost artistically. He began all but three at-bats with fastballs, but he ended most at-bats with offspeed pitches: Ten of his 11 strikeouts were on sliders.

Fortunately for Sanchez, the Giants’ offense did just enough. Though the offense scored the fewest runs of any National League playoff team during the regular season and seemed as if it might continue to be this team’s Achilles’ heel, the Giants pushed across three runs with the help of some shoddy Atlanta defense. Two of Brooks Conrad’s three errors in the game helped contribute to Giants runs.

Coming through in the clutch was the key at the end of the game, which swung wildly in each direction. In the bottom of the eighth inning, pinch hitter Eric Hinske hit what most Atlantans may have considered the game-winning home run off Giants reliever Sergio Romo. Down the right-field line and barely fair, his home run was worth a whopping 57.8 percent in win probability added, as the game swung from 28.8 percent likely for the Braves to 86.6 percent in one big moment.

As an aside, a bit of gamesmanship from the retiring Bobby Cox may have led to Bruce Bochy taking Sanchez out of the game. After the Giants lefty gave up a single, Cox showed righty Troy Glaus as the pinch hitter. Bochy went with the right-handed Sergio Romo in relief in order to exploit the platoon advantage. Cox pulled Glaus and went with lefty Hinske. The rest is, as they say, history.

But the Giants were not done. Freddy Sanchez, 0-for-3 with a walk before coming to the plate in the ninth inning, faced fireballer Craig Kimbrel, closing for the Braves with Billy Wagner hurt. Sanchez was down to his final strike before lacing a single up the middle. Then Aubrey Huff, in the single most tense and important at-bat of the game, drove in the tying run and swung the pendulum back close to 50 percent by adding 34.9 percent of win probability with his bat. One batter later, Conrad’s error on Buster Posey’s grounder sent the Giants to within one win of taking the series.

Jonathan Sanchez got the team most of the way there, but without Mike Fontenot, Freddy Sanchez, Aubrey Huff, and — yes — Brooks Conrad, the Giants would have been a tough-luck losers.

The final score might not reflect it, but the Rays’ Game 3 win didn’t come easily. In four of the first five innings the Rays put six runners on base, but could not bring around any of them to score. Then, once they did start showing life in the later innings, they had to overcome a baserunning mistake and then an extra-wide strike zone before they could mount their comebacks. Twice in this game the Rays came from behind to force a Game 4.

John Jaso’s go-ahead RBI single might have rated the most significant play of the game, but the most important series of events came in the sixth. While the Rays had those six baserunners in the first five innings, they failed to get a hit after a man reached. In the sixth they got off to a good start with an Evan Longoria walk. Matt Joyce hit a soft grounder and avoided getting doubled up, but he still created an out with a runner on base.

Dan Johnson, the second lefty to face relief pitcher Derek Holland, took the first five pitches of his at-bat and worked the count full. Holland went with a fastball away on the sixth pitch, but Johnson reached out and pulled it into right field. The situation for the Rays appeared favorable. They had runners on first and second with one out, which would have given them a win expectancy of 40.1 percent, an increase of 5.9 percent on the play. But the play wasn’t over yet.

Joyce overran second and lost his balance trying to return. Nelson Cruz alertly fired back in, and Ian Kinsler applied the tag in time. That caused the Rays’ win expectancy to tumble all the way to 29.4 percent. The loss in win expectancy from having runners at first and second with one out to a runner on first with two outs is 10.5 percent. That was the single costliest WPA swing of the game, and it nearly cost the Rays another opportunity. Thankfully for them, Carlos Pena and B.J. Upton came through.

Pena had a poor year by his standards, but he was particularly poor against lefties. He struck out in 38.5 percent of his at-bats and hit for far less power than he did against righties. Again, the lefty Holland didn’t have to worry much. Holland delivered four straight pitches well out of the zone, which gave the Rays another chance with a runner in scoring position. Upton took advantage, lining an inside fastball down the left-field line for a double that tied the game. The walk and the double were worth plus-20.7 percent win probability added.

The Rays then threatened to take the lead in the seventh inning. Ben Zobrist hit a one-out double, raising the Rays’ chances of winning by 7.2 percent. The win probability stat is context-neutral, meaning it doesn’t take into consideration the hitters coming to bat. It might have been worth a bit more if it knew that Carl Crawford and Longoria each had a shot to bring home the go-ahead run. Unfortunately, a poor strike zone doomed Crawford. He fouled off the first pitch, but then saw two fastballs that appeared to be way outside. But the home plate ump called both a strike, costing the Rays 6.1 percent in win probability added.

A half inning later, Kinsler gave the Rangers the lead, but the Rays fought back with their big eighth inning. Unlike their previous scoring situations, this one went relatively smoothly. The Rays had to overcome some adversity — some of their own doing, some out of their control — to get there, but they forced a Game 4 on Sunday.

Chants of “Replay!” rained down on Tropicana Field in the fifth inning of the second American League Division Series game between the Tampa Bay Rays and the Texas Rangers on Thursday afternoon.

Although we all know that home crowds can exaggerate at times, the controversy here was real. Michael Young was seemingly out on a half swing with runners on first and second and one out in the fifth. Instead, the umpires ruled that Young checked his swing, and on the next pitch, Young took Chad Qualls deep to center field to increase the Rangers’ lead from 2-0 to 5-0.

Top five plays (all percentages from Rangers’ standpoint):

Top 5th, 1 out, 2 on: Michael Young HR, +15.3 percent win probability (77.2 percent to 92.5 percent)
Top 4th, 2 out, 0 on: Ian Kinsler HR, +11.2 percent win probability (57.7 percent to 68.9 percent )
Top 3rd, 1 out, 1 on: Elvis Andrus single, Matt Treanor to third, +5.2 percent win probability (51.9 percent to 57.1 percent)
Top 2nd, 1 out, 0 on: Nelson Cruz double, +4.2 percent win probability (47.6% to 51.8%)
Top 3rd, 0 out, 0 on: Matt Treanor hit by pitch, +3.9 percent win probability (50% to 53.9%)

(No play in the Rays’ favor had a WPA > 0.038)

It’s hard to call this a turning point in the game, as the Rangers already held the lead and were threatening. Instead, this was more of the breaking point for the Rays. The Rays’ win expectancy entering the play was already low at 22.8 percent. The home run lowered the Rays’ win probability to 7.5 percent, putting the Rangers in cruise control both in the game and in the series, with two of the three remaining games coming at Rangers Ballpark in Arlington.

The play comes out to a total WPA of +15.7 percent. However, part of what makes this play so big and so important in the scope of this game is that, by some accounts, Young should have been out before it even happened. According to the WPA inquirer at The Hardball Times, the situation if Young is called out — two outs, runners on first and second, and a two-run Rangers lead in the top of the fifth — comes out to a 26.6 percent win expectancy for the Rays. That still wouldn’t put optimism into many Tampa denizens, but at least it gives the Rays a fighting shot with players such as Evan Longoria and Carl Crawford yet to receive two or three at-bats. This adds about 4 percent to the win probability difference of the play, as the combination of the check swing called for a ball followed by the home run cost the Rays about a fifth of a win.

It’s easy to say that the call and the play don’t matter at all, as the Rays didn’t even manage to muster a run against C.J. Wilson and then the Rangers’ bullpen. However, that’s a basic case of the fallacy of the predetermined outcome. C.J. Wilson may have been forced to pitch more carefully or under more pressure in the later innings, and perhaps the Rays could have pushed a couple of runs home. By that same token, it’s possible that Josh Hamilton, hitting after Michael Young, would’ve hit a three-run home run instead. We simply don’t know what would have happened, and the home run certainly changed the landscape of the game.

Young’s home run gave the Rangers an insurmountable lead and has pushed the Rays to the brink of elimination. That play certainly wasn’t the only reason the Rays lost — an anemic offense and constant pressure from Rangers hitters deserve blame and credit respectively. When it comes down to one moment in Game 2, though, the Young home run was the biggest moment of the game and of the season to date for these two teams.